is our 79th report on the consequences of the stock market mania
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The articles below are
reprinted from previous issues of Crosscurrents
and are chosen for their timeliness
REPRINTED FROM THE MAY 26th
ISSUE OF CROSSCURRENTS
Our first observations of a potential mania in
progress surfaced in the late 1990s as Dollar Trading Volume (DTV) began
a near vertical ascent. What had formerly been a staid yet solid
bull market suddenly turned into a rip roaring all speed ahead and out
of control affair as valuations went out the window. The public was
well on the way to “all in” status, equivalent to a high stakes Texas Hold’em
game and betting on the River to bail out any poor judgments as the mania
took stocks to insane heights.
The statistics were startling. In just ten
years into the 2000 manic high, DTV rose more than 18-fold from $1.8 trillion
to over $32.6 trillion. Despite the enormous influx of cash into
both investment and trading, total stock market capitalization climbed
only five-and-a-half fold. The average holding period for U.S. stocks
fell from more than 19 months to less than 6 months as the theme of buying
for the long term quickly became a forgotten refrain. And as greed
completely overtook any sense of reality, margin debt ran to an all time
high. The stage was set for a collapse.
Post collapse, The Fed and the financial industry
were unable to face the fact that a veritable mania had come and gone and
figured the best cure for the $9 trillion in wealth that had evaporated
would be to simply encourage the exact same type of behavior that previously
accommodated the financial markets. No moves were taken to stifle
another run of inane and excessive risk taking into the 2007 peaks for
both stocks and the housing markets. Not even lip service was paid
to the burgeoning speculation. As a result, DTV skyrocketed from
$18.1 trillion when stocks bottomed in 2002, to $48.3 trillion in 2008.
Holding periods fell to the lowest ever, a mere 2.6 months, and margin
debt achieved another record high in July 2007, exceeding the March 2000
high by $116 billion. Again, the stage was set for a collapse. No
attention whatsoever was paid to the specter of extreme risk. What
unfolded was easily predictable.
We now find ourselves at a very similar time only
seven years later, as if the mania cycle ordinarily repeats in just this
fashion, every seventh year. While our featured chart shows DTV falling
shy of a new record vs. GDP, at the present pace it will most certainly
set another record in 2014. The previous record of $65 trillion in
2010 will easily fall and may even be eclipsed by the Thanksgiving holiday.
Average holding periods are now only 3.6 months, so it is again only about
the short term. Since long term investment is not a factor, you can
bet the farm that all the valuation methodologies you ever read about for
stocks no longer matter for the vast majority of players.
We haven’t mentioned program trading in long
while and perhaps we should. The official definition is “the purchase
or sale of at least 15 different stocks with a total value of $1 million
or more,” a process which has typically meant index arbitrage in the past.
In practice, if index futures traded at a discount to the constituent
issues, program traders would buy the futures and short the constituents,
ensuring a profit. If index futures were at a premium to the constituents,
program traders would sell the futures and simultaneously buy the constituent
stocks, again ensuring a profit. It wasn’t quite that simple 100%
of the time but close enough to see that valuations were not a factor and
that positions could potentially be unwound almost immediately, trading
that was ultimately high frequency. By the end of 1999, 10% of all
volume on the NYSE was catalyzed by programs. The growth of program
trading was spectacular. The 13-week average of program trading ascended
May 2002 — 15%
August 2003 — 20%
June 2004 — 25%
May 2006 -– 30%
June 2007 -– 35%
Finally, as of the week of September 21, 2012,
programs weighed in at 48.6% of total NYSE volume. But it wasn’t
just programs; HFT was completely taking over the arena. Other
strategies were constantly added to the mix in huge quantity and we wound
up with momentum traders, technical signal traders, “filter” traders, the
very same statistical arbitrage traders and even rebate traders, who were
rewarded simply for producing volume and the illusion of liquidity.
For the first time in market history, it was possible to lose money on
trades, yet make money from rebates offered by the exchange where the volume
occurred. Did fair valuations of company prospects play a role in
any of the churn? Hardly. See the August 19, 2013 issue of
Crosscurrents for a more thorough explanation (http://www.cross-currents.net/c081913c.pdf).
The twin collapses of 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 have done a great job of
scaring the public away from trusting Wall Street and for good reason.
The industry has designed itself to take advantage
of the little guy from so many angles that there is little sense to step
into the arena. This is one reason we suspect the American Association
of Individual Investors (AAII) sentiment tallies continue to display a
distinct lack of enthusiasm for stocks. According to the AAII website,
the long term average is 39% Bulls and 30.5% Bears. As of last week,
Bulls were only 33.1%. In contrast, the Investor’s Intelligence survey
of advisors has Bulls averaging 48.2% and Bears at 21.3% over the last
two full years. As of last week, Bulls were at 55.1%. That’s
a rather startling dichotomy that speaks volumes about the public’s level
of trust. Of course, one reason for distrust is the level of misinformation
that circulates from both the financial industry, the Federal government
and the media. You cannot fool all of the people all of the time.
At center, despite one of the longest and most emphatic bull markets in
history, constant dollar wealth topped at the end of 1999. Friday’s
close was still 7% away. In addition, by February 2014, margin debt
ran to over $500 billion for the first time in history, peaking at $502
billion, almost 3% of GDP. Not only is a new wealth record still
some distance away, stocks are saddled to the greatest extent ever by leverage
and the attendant risk.
Again, we point to the chart at lower right as
the best sign of a major stock market peak. While it cannot be utilized
as a short term signal, this third astounding levitation is evidence of
an impending bear market and a decline in price that is likely to resemble
the prior two. Perhaps we won’t collapse by 50%. Perhaps the
damage will not extend two years out in time as in did from the 2000 peak.
However, our bear market target of Dow 12,471 is roughly 25% lower than
today and we would expect at least a full year will be needed to correct
margin debt to reasonable levels and to expand the cash-to-assets ratio
of mutual funds to the point that they are compelled to seek value.
Dollar Trading Volume is on track to hit a new
record of $70 trillion. In a day and age when notional values of
derivatives can reach $240 trillion and one bank alone holds a portfolio
of $70 trillion, one’s eyes tend to gloss over large numbers; they tend
to lose their meaning.
We’d advise not to lose perspective.
The numbers and the charts are
every bit as astonishing and meaningful
as they were at the 2000 and
The Chart Of The Year.
REPRINTED FROM THE MARCH 30th
ISSUE OF CROSSCURRENTS (CHART UPDATED THROUGH MAY)
We are told liquidity is driving the market.
Prices are rising because investors are flush with cash with nowhere else
to go. We are told that prices will continue to rise because stocks
remain undervalued. With the Fed’s taper assured, stocks are the
only game in town. We’ll attack all the assumptions one by one but
let’s begin with our candidate for Chart of the Year. We measure
net liquidity by subtracting margin debt from the absolute level of mutual
fund cash. While the mutual fund cash to assets ratio is near record
lows, the entire stock market is so huge that there is still a substantial
amount of cash that could theoretically be spent, either to increase prices
or to stop a major decline in its tracks. When liquidity is positive,
the market typically has a lot of room to rally. The more liquidity,
the more room to rally. However, the arena depends upon speculation
to get the juices flowing, thus bull markets thrive on borrowed money and
as prices surge higher, liquidity eventually turns negative. This
is not unusual. However, when liquidity suddenly plunges to deeply
negative levels, as it did in 2000 and 2007, all bets on the bull market
continuing are off. As our featured chart clearly illustrates, this
is the case we face at this time. Liquidity is not only negative,
it is at its most negative level in history and is plunging at a rate that
can only be considered terminal.
Liquidity went from negative $19.5 billion from October
1999 to $121.3 billion in March 2000, at the very peak of the tech mania.
At the time, the steep drop in liquidity was the fastest ever. Liquidity
dropped sharply again over the ten months from negative $13.5 billion in
August 2006 to negative $192.6 billion in July 2007, just three months
before a massive stock market top. And for the third time, liquidity
has again plunged—this time in two stages—the last of which has removed
another $66 billion in liquidity in only seven months, taking net liquidity
to negative $209 billion, well below the 2007 low. We believe this
picture qualifies as the Chart of the Year, even though we are but one
quarter of the way into 2014. Then again, we expect to see even scarier
charts before long.
Despite massive ignorance up to the March 2000
tech mania peak and the autumn 2007 mania highs, there is now total agreement
that both were incredible bubbles, the kind you see only once in a lifetime….except
it happened twice in seven-and-a-half years. In retrospect, we wonder
if there could have ever been a more flagrant disregard for risk but then
we see our featured chart and wonder no more. For the third time
in 14 years, U.S. stocks are in a bubble and far more leveraged than ever
For the 55 years since 1958, margin debt has averaged
only 1% of gross domestic product (GDP). On two occasions, margin
debt soared above 2% of GDP and stock prices were soon cut in half.
There are only three instances in which stock prices were cut in half in
modern history; the crash from 1929-1932, the crash from 2000-2002 and
the crash from 2007-2009.
Margin debt is now $502 billion and 3% of GDP,
triple what passes for average and is so much higher than our danger signal
that we are convinced a similar fate as the two previous collapsed bubbles
lies in store for U.S. stocks. Although we admit our expectation
that prices will be cut in half is a worst case scenario, the odds certainly
favor a decline of 30%-35%. As the tech mania in 2000 clearly proved,
it is possible to have a phase in which no price is too high and stocks
continue to be bid up despite valuations that are even insane. Despite
our conviction on February 28, 2000 that Nasdaq was facing a 35% crash
in only six weeks, tech stocks kept on rising for another nine days and
another 11% on the upside. Truly mind boggling. We are apparently
in a similar phase. No price is too high and no risk is too scary
to accommodate in the quest for another winning trade. It might all
be somewhat more palatable if leverage and liquidity seemed better able
to handle the inevitable correction but instead, they are in the worst
position since 1929.
We believe stocks will crash.
Six Paragraphs On Risk.
REPRINTED FROM THE MAY 26th
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
released the fourth quarter 2013 report on derivatives, showing total notional
values of $237 trillion, down a nominal $3 trillion from the third quarter
report. Despite a modest pickup in the government’s stated data for
GDP, the 5-year trend for growth remains far outpaced by the fantastic
growth of derivatives in bank portfolios. It is our view that this
gigantic tally represents a fair appraisal of systemic risk and the more
risk is maintained, the more impedance is generated to hinder future economic
growth. The simplest inference is that America’s best growth years
are behind it, a posit that seems increasingly likely when examining the
last dozen years.
While derivatives do not necessarily equate directly
to leverage, these financial constructs have enabled leverage on a far
greater scale than ever seen in our history. We can see vast increases
in leverage in every aspect of our society. Federal government debt
has more than tripled since 2000 and is rising at an annual rate of over
8.4%. At the current pace, there is not only no hope of ever paying
down debt to a manageable size, we are likely ensuring a massive problem
in the next 10-20 years when the only solution to accommodate economic
growth will be an inflationary phase that makes the 1970s look tame by
Our charts and comments regarding margin debt in
the stock market are more proof of how much leverage is built into our
society. When former Fed Chairman commented 18 years ago why the
Fed had refused to raise margin rates under Reg. T, he posited that alternative
methods to raise borrowed money made an increase in margin rates a meaningless
move. No doubt the ease of acquiring home equity lines of credit
and even loans via credit card advances helped fuel the tremendous mania
in 2000. Meanwhile, what the former Fed Chairman did not say was
that the Fed’s reluctance to move favored the financial industry, which
would have lost one of their big profit centers had margin rates been raised.
As usual, the rationale has always been to protect the financial industry.
The public interest is avoided.
The greatest failing of the Fed has been to avoid
any statement about excessive leverage in our society. However, too
much debt is a bad thing. Excusing alternative methods of increasing
leverage in order to accommodate the financial industry has been a monstrous
error. The Fed’s policies have led to an over-utilization of leverage
and today’s record levels of margin debt and notional values of derivatives
point out that risk continues to reside at the highest levels ever.
There is a wide gap in between the derivative portfolios
of the top four commercial bank portfolios and the next five but altogether,
they account for 99.2% of all derivatives. We almost suffered a worst
case scenario in 1987, another worst case scenario in 1998 and yet another
in 2008, yet we remain on track for another worst case scenario as if this
is the accepted standard. As we have said on many occasions, it is
not a matter of if, but when. A failure of any of these banks in
a worst case scenario will likely threaten the entire financial system.
The bull has now endured for 62 months, a
full year more than the average of the previous eight bull markets measuring
from 1966. Given we now reside in the Dead Zone, the timing seems
perfect for a new bear market. Inflows have already turned negative
for domestic mutual funds, suffering $5 billion in outflows over the last
Our bear market target of Dow
12,471, down 25.5% from the May 13th high of 16,735 remains a viable and
Back To The Future.
In our view, 117 years of history is enough to
provide a guideline for the future. We use many methods to provide
guidelines for our long term targets and one of the simplest is a 5% regression
Over the really long term, it has been shown that
stocks return approximately 5% per annum. It is only since the great
secular bull market began 1982 that stocks seem to be capable of 7% per
annum (or greater) returns. But then again, it appears the regression
line always eventually wins out.
Clearly, despite trading above our line for roughly
13 years, the Dow Industrials collapsed in 2009, taking our the line by
a huge margin. We're not calling for another decline of that magnitude
but we do believe that stocks can crash and we are quite confident that
this major index will once again make the journey to the regression line
that currently stands at 12,844. .
We've been there before.
To see a free sample copy
of the Crosscurrents newsletter,
***THIS USED TO BE OUR FORECAST SECTION***
Several years ago, an obscure internet
blogger published a purported "study" of stock market forecasters.
In our case, the blog reported accuracy ratings that we can only describe
as devised and so far from accurate as to be laughable. His studies
often included his own judgmental observations and he then attempted to
couch them with statistical relevancy, a tainted process that strays far
Our forecasts were interpreted incorrectly
and denigrated. We have no desire to direct any traffic to this blog
and if you are interested in seeing the "study," you will have to search
The blog admits "The Crosscurrents
forecasts/targets frequently include qualifications/embellishments that
makes testing difficult," yet the ratings were undertaken as if gospel.
The blog further admits that "a few very bad forecasts make the average
absolute error high." Ironically, and most disturbingly, those very
same forecasts begin and end with our initial forecast of a secular bear
market bottom at Dow 6400, originally published on our website as far back
as 2003 and published in our Washington, DC speech before the International
Federation of Technical Analysts in November of 2003. However,
as our initially cited
time target was pushed out with each new
forecast, the aforementioned study considered the entire forecast before
it to be utterly wrong and in some cases, awarded us a rating of minus
80% accuracy. That is a stunning misapplication of statistical science,
in that the actual bear market low to date was Dow 6469 print basis on
March 6, 2009. On a number of occasions, we also specified an SPX
low of 680, about as close as one can get to the actual 683 closing low.
We not only forecasted the
actual price bottom with pinpoint accuracy,
we did so six years
before the fact.
Moreover and most importantly, we
typically cite our upside parameters as "potential" and downside parameters
as "risk," in order to highlight both the best and worst possible cases.
The study incorrectly interprets each of these parameters as actual forecasts,
which must, by definition, make one or the other of our parameters hopelessly
wrong. The market cannot move in both directions at once. Thus,
the study misapplies our comments and analysis.
Ironically, the accepted wisdom in
our business is never forecast both price and time together. If a
time is specified, never specify a price. If a price is specified,
never specify a time. It is sufficiently difficult to forecast one
of the two aspects alone. Most forecasters follow this golden rule.
When we issue a forecast, we typically do not follow the golden rule.
However, the denigration of our analysis by this faulted study has cast
a serious pall on our desire to continue publishing price and time forecasts
for the benefit of the public on the free portion of this website.
The Crosscurrents website has had more than three-and-a-half million visitors
since it was established in 1999 and we are quite proud to display just
a few of the many kudos accorded us by readers at http://www.cross-currents.net/kudos.htm.
We did not earn these kudos
by publishing wrong forecasts time after time.
Despite our desire to continue serving
the public, we will no longer expose our analysis to faulty studies on
the free portion of our website. Therefore, our policy has changed.
While we will continue to publish the very popular Pictures of a Stock
Market Mania feature, we will no longer provide any price and time forecasts
or parameters for the public as have accompanied this feature in the past.
The subscriber portion of our website will have the same article accompanied
by price and time forecasts and other parameters as we deem significant,
as it always has. If you wish to see these forecasts and or parameters,
we suggest you subscribe.
You can also get access to our report with a special
three month subscription, only $49 and accompanied by a $49 discount
towards a one-year renewal.
OF THE ENTIRE WEBSITE ARE COPYRIGHT 2014 CROSSCURRENTS PUBLICATIONS, LLC
I hope you have enjoyed your visit. Please
return again and feel free to invite your friends to visit as well.
Alan M. Newman, July 13, 2014
The entire Crosscurrents website has logged
close to 4 million visits.
All information on this website is
prepared from data obtained from sources believed reliable, but not guaranteed
by us, and is not considered to be all inclusive. Any stocks, sectors
or indexes mentioned on this page are not to be construed as buy, sell,
hold or short recommendations. This report is for informational and
entertainment purposes only. Persons affiliated with Crosscurrents
Publications, LLC may be long or short the securities or related options
or other derivative securities mentioned in this report. Our perspectives
are subject to change without notice. We assume no responsibility
or liability for the information contained in this report. No investment
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